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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there have been a number of cases where 
military aircraft were used to drop food and other relief supplies 
to populations that were in danger of starvation due to famine, 
conflict, or both. Despite the high cost of such operations, there 
have been an increasing number of proposals to use airdrops in 
similar situations, especially in operations that have attracted 
major media attention and where US military airlift capacity has 
been committed. Given the renewed interest in using this approach, 
it is worthwhile to examine the systems available, and more 
importantly, the lessons learned from previous experiences.
AIRDROP METHODS
There are generally three methods that can be used to airdrop 
supplies:
1. Free drops:
In this method, specially packed cargo is dropped from a low 
flying aircraft, free falls to the ground (hopefully into a 
designated drop zone) and is gathered on the ground for 
distribution. This method is normally only used for delivering 
food (usually grain) or other non-breakable items. Free-drops were 
used extensively in Ethiopia 1985-86.
2. Parachute drops:
Cargos are bundled onto specially designed pallets to which 
large cargo parachutes are attached. As the cargo is dropped out 
of the cargo bay, the chutes are deployed by a static line that 
trails from the plane and the cargo drifts down to the drop zone. 
This method was used to drop supplies to the Kurds in northern Iraq 
after the Gulf War in 1991.
3. Low altitude parachute extraction system (LAPES):
Cargos are strapped to specially designed pallets that can be 
rolled out the rear of the plane as it makes a low pass (usually no 
more than 1 or two meters above the ground). As each pallet rolls 
into position on the rear cargo ramp, the cargomaster deploys the 
parachute attached to the pallet which pops open in the plane's 
slipstream and hauls the pallet out of the plane, slows its forward 
velocity, and lands it horizontally. This method was designed to 
land vehicles and breakable equipment but can also be used to drop
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a variety of relief cargos including food. Parachute extraction 
used to drop food to mountain villages in Southeast Asia in the 
1970s.
CASE STUDIES
1. The Ethiopian Airdrops (1984-6)
In 1985, an international airlift —  composed of C-130s from 
Sweden, Britain and Belgium (and later Canada); C-160 Transalls 
from the Federal Republic of Germany; and Antanov An-12s from the 
USSR, combined with helicopters from Poland —  began delivering 
food to remote areas of a famine zone in Ethiopia's northern 
provinces of Eritrea and Tigray. Technically, the operation was a 
huge success. At the high point of the operation, 10,000 metric 
tons of food were delivered per month.
Most of the food was airlifted to remote airstrips, then 
trucked to distribution points in nearby communities. However, in 
late 1984, relief agencies requested the RAF to drop food to two 
remote villages that were said to be cut off from the outside by 
rains. Within a month, the RAF was dropping food to 20 villages 
and by the height of the air drop operation, that number had 
quadrupled. The operation took on a life of its own, eventually 
lasting until early 1986. The RAF and Luftwaffe planes airdropped 
grains using free-drop delivery.
Initially, the food was dropped to large villages or small 
towns in the center of a remote area; from there it was carried to 
smaller outlying villages by a variety of surface transport. Later, 
the planes began dropping directly to small remote villages. Relief 
agencies placed small teams on the ground to guide the airdrops, 
collect the food and allocate it to the local relief committees.
Technically, the effort was remarkable, for only minimal food 
losses resulted (less than 10% from the drops). Yet there were a 
number of unresolved issues, cost concerns being among the most 
obvious. The Hercules, which bore the brunt of the airdrop 
operation and often carried 15-ton loads, can only carry a load 
equivalent to half that of the grain lorries used in Ethiopia. The 
average cost of one flight equalled the cost of leasing a grain 
truck and fueling it for 6 months; the cost of several flights 
could have bought a good truck. Critics argued that an equal 
investment in land transportation would have been of more lasting 
benefit in transport-poor Ethiopia.
One justification for the airlift was the need for speed to 
save starving people. However, the argument doesn't stand up. It 
took two Hercs operating 6 days to deliver what one small convoy 
could deliver within the same period.
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Another reason given was that many communities were 
inaccessible by road (variously because of fighting or the rainy 
season) . Two things should be pointed out. First, many of the 
villages could be, and were, reached by relief lorries at the same 
time that the airdrops were underway. While it's true that convoys 
were sometimes slowed by rain, swollen rivers, or mudslides, they 
simply waited until the impasse could be overcome —  usually only 
a matter of hours. The total time lost waiting was not a 
significant factor in the total amount of supplies delivered within 
the specified food distribution cycle (in this case, one month).
Second, during the rainy season commercial lorry traffic 
reached over three quarters of the communities where air drops 
occurred and in the remaining villages, food was delivered by 
commercial traders by pack animals. Commercial traders also 
reached the villages during the government's offensives.
It has been claimed that the air drop effort had some impact 
on reducing population migration during the famine. (Migration is 
one of the worst results of famine and significantly prolongs 
relief efforts.) Unfortunately, there is little evidence to 
support this claim one way or the other. By the time the air drops 
were regularly delivering supplies, migration was beginning to 
taper off, largely because ground-based relief operations in the 
vicinity were stemming the outward flow of people.
The airlift's supporters claimed that the airdrops saved 
thousands of lives by delivering critically needed food. There is 
no evidence to support this claim. By the time the overall air 
operation got into full swing, death rates among the affected 
populations had already begun to decline, a sign that most of 
vulnerable people in the population had already died.
There were a number of political issues that should also be 
mentioned. The planes operated from goyernment-held areas in full 
cooperation with Ethiopian authorities. This had several results. 
The airlift was viewed with some suspicion by the two principal 
insurgent fronts: the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and 
the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF). In their minds, the 
international community had taken sides. Thus, the mantle of 
neutrality needed by relief agencies to operate in conflict zones 
was lost.
An even more important issue was that vital negotiations 
between the rebels and the government over safe passage for relief 
convoys were lost because the government had an "out" with the
Initial flights were operated under the direction of the Ethiopian Commissioner of Relief & 
Rehabilitation with clearances from the Ethiopian Air Force. Later, the planes were operated under the UN 
banner but still with clearances and close supervision by the CORR and Ethiopian Air Force.
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airlift. The negotiations could have opened more roads and made 
the food relief effort far more effective; in the case of Eritrea, 
a cease-fire for relief would have had even more benefits and 
possibly led to further peace discussions. So long as the planes 
were ther^, the Ethiopians did not feel under pressure to 
negotiate.
Another concern was the scale of the airlift and the fact that 
it was carried out during various offensives by the Ethiopian 
forces. It has been pointed out that the airlift permitted the 
Ethiopian Air Force to continue to use its own resources for the 
war effort (and even a controversial forced resettlement program). 
Critics point out that the Ethiopians (and the Soviets) had the 
transport capacity to undertake a major portion of the air 
operation, but because the international community was doing it 
felt no obligation to do so.
For the international relief community, the airlift was also 
the easy way out of a major dilemma. They had been experiencing 
great difficulty negotiating with the Ethiopian government on 
"humanitarian access," i.e., the right to deliver relief to famine 
victims in the war zone. When the government failed to negotiate 
a safe passage agreement with the rebels, it was easier to ask for 
air support than to continue to badger the government. Thus, a 
move towards peace was lost. This was not a failure of the 
military; it was a failure of civilian relief authorities and 
diplomatic missions. But the mere availability of the airlift 
capacity reduced the necessity of taking a hard line with the 
Ethiopians. (It is interesting that the fund-raising media used by 
the agencies during the period rarely mentioned the fact that a war 
was going on.)
This issue has arisen in peacekeeping operations where critics have claimed that successful 
peacekeeping has led to stalemated negotiations, for example in Cyprus. As long as the two sides are not 
fighting, there is less pressure to conclude a comprehensive peace agreement.
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Lessons learned:
• Speed of delivery was not a significant factor. Airdrops 
would only be warranted:
1) if the amount of food delivered by air exceeds the 
amount that could be delivered by surface within the 
normal food distribution cycle, or
2) if the amount delivered in one or two flight 
rotations is sufficient to meet all the emergency 
food requirements of a village or small community 
until normal means can be used to reach the area.
• Weather and terrain obstacles were vastly overrated by the 
relief agencies —  access by ground was possible in 
virtually every case.
• Aircraft should only be used for operations that cannot 
be carried out by other means, i.e., they should not be 
seen as an end in themselves.
• Military forces should not be committed without a clear 
agreement from both sides of the conflict.
• Commanders should ascertain whether the commitment of air 
assets will help or undermine negotiations between warring 
parties.
• Equal access to relief supplies should be guaranteed 
before the relief effort commences.
• Military detachments should operate under neutral 
humanitarian aid authorities (and, where possible, from 
neutral bases).
2. Ethiopian air drops (1974)
During the 1974 famine in Ethiopia, a Swedish relief agency 
organized air drops of food to remote villages and small bands of 
nomads. The operation started off using small, single engine 
military liaison aircraft with bags of food attached to the wing 
hardpoints. The planes flew out to the remote areas searching for 
bands of nomads, then dropped the food to them when they were 
spotted. This practice quickly ended when it became clear that 
there wa^ no way to determine from the air which bands were 
starving.
disasters Journal, Volume VI, 1979
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As the famine grew worse, there were not enough relief 
personnel to work in all the villages and reports of starvation in 
remote villages in the eastern desert areas continued to be 
received by the government. Thus, village airdrops were continued 
with the help of several C-130s from Sweden. Villages were 
targeted by relief committees set up by the government and food was 
free-dropped at regular intervals. There was no organization on 
the ground to receive the food because the relief organizations did 
not have spare personnel to send to the more remote areas and it 
was argued that the traditional village structure would be able to 
sort out a fairly equitable distribution.
In the middle of the operation, a Swedish military and UNICEF 
medical team visited several of the villages to determine how the 
airdrops were going. They found a disturbing situation.
First, there was no appreciable difference in mortality between 
villages that received airdropped food and those that didn't. The 
investigators were told that the airdrops had created chaos on the 
ground. The strongest and best-armed factions within the community 
quickly rushed to the drop zone, cornered the food, and took it 
away to sell in nearby markets. When subsequent drops occurred, 
outside factions would raid the villages and take the food away 
from those that had it. In some cases, nearby villages that had 
not received food by air participated in attacks on the villages 
that had. Thus, the intended beneficiaries rarely obtained any of 
the food.
As a result, UNICEF and several other agencies decided to send 
mobile teams to the villages to receive the food from the planes. 
They set up drop zones, organized perimeter guards and then 
signaled the planes to drop the food. Once it was on the ground, 
they distributed it via a village relief committee, then departed 
for the next community.
At the end of the operation, it was re-evaluated. The 
assessment found that there had been only a slight improvement in 
the general mortality rate. It seems that as soon as the mobile 
team left the area, the stronger members of the community would 
come around to the weaker members and demand a share of the food.
One interesting point should be noted. During the second 
evaluation, the team learned that even at the height of the famine, 
commercial traders had been reaching the area with food to sell. 
While prices were too high for the poorest and most malnourished to 
afford, some trading did occur. (Apparently the traders were not 
attacked because they had armed escorts.) However, when the 
airdrops began, the traders quit coming, forcing those with money 
but no food to buy, to leave the community. The villagers felt 
that the airdrops had been a negative factor overall and had 
contributed to the breakdown of the community's social structure.
Lessons learned:
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• Airdrops can only be successful if there is a team on the 
ground to control the landing zone, receive the food, 
organize an eguitable distribution, and remain in the 
community to ensure that stronger factions do not take the 
food away from weaker members of the society.
• Without a continuing presence of the monitors, villages 
that receive airdrops soon become prey for armed 
marauders.
• Airdrops may lead traders to conclude that there is no
market for their goods and thus, to cease trading in those 
villages. This, in turn, could lead to higher out­
migration and a subsequent collapse of the social 
structure and coping mechanisms.
3. Operation Provide Comfort (Northern Iraq) 1991
In April, 1991, over 400,000 Kurds fled into the mountains of 
northern Iraq to escape attacks by the Iraqi military trying to 
quell the uprising that had occurred in the aftermath of the Gulf 
War. To supply the Kurds, the US Defence Department ordered the US 
Air Force to parachute food, blankets, and tents to the Kurds until 
a relief operation could be mounted. The operation was originally 
intended to buy time, but it lasted for almost 5 weeks.
As a relief tool, the air drop portion of the overall 
operation was only a moderate success, but as a political and 
tactical tool it was brilliant. When the Pentagon first proposed 
dropping supplies in early April, the initial response of the 
relief agencies and the US government's humanitarian arm, the 
Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), was negative. 
Experience with airdrops in other situations had convinced them 
that they were not an effective way of delivering relief supplies. 
OFDA staff believed that using some combination of trucks and pack 
animals would be more productive.
However, Dayton Maxwell, the deputy director of OFDA and a 
consultant (the author) convinced the State Department and the 
National Security Council to support airdrops in this situation. 
Maxwell, who had had experience with airdrops in Laos, believed 
that they could buy the agencies time to get organized. The author 
argued that the airlifts would provide an entree for a much larger 
operation. The world would agree to the concept of dropping food 
and shelter to the Kurds and would recognize the need to provide 
armed escorts for the aircraft to protect them from Iraqi attacks. 
Once fighters were committed, it would not be unreasonable to warn 
the Iraqis to stay away from the area to prevent an incident. 
Without their own air cover, the Iraqi troops would be forced to 
withdraw from the border area. Once they pulled back, the Allies
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could send NGOs and possibly ground troops into the refugee 
encampments. Later, when the situation had calmed down, the 
agencies could send food and other relief goods back to the Kurds 
villages and draw them back to their homes. Thus, the airdrops 
could initiate a chain of events that made a larger operation 
possible. Ostensibly intended to deliver critical relief supplies, 
the US was able to use the airlift as a "Trojan Horse" to initiate 
a full-scale humanitarian intervention.
On a technical level, the air drops of food were of marginal 
value. There were three reasons why. First, the main food dropped 
was boxes of pre-packed military rations (Meals Ready to Eat or 
MREs) . From a nutritional standpoint, the MREs were of doubtful 
value and many medical personnel believed that they may have 
contributed to dehydration and diarrhea. Furthermore, a high 
percentage of the MREs were thrown away or wasted because the 
people, who were Muslims, discarded the pork meals (some packs were 
tossed away because the people thought that the oils were pork 
fat) .
Although the MREs were readily available and easy to deliver, 
they were not a good choice for the airdrops. Almost one-half the 
weight of an MRE is in the packing material, which meant that only 
half the total weight dropped was actually food. (When the weight 
of the pallet and parachutes is added, the amount of food actually 
carried by each flight is about 40% of the load.)
The Air Force also attempted to drop bottled water to the 
camps with very little success: on one drop witnessed by AID'S 
Disaster Assistance Response Team (D^RT), 95% of the plastic 
bottles burst when they hit the ground.
Perhaps the worst affect of the airdrops was the chaos that 
they set off in the ground. Thousands of people would run out into 
the drop zone to retrieve the supplies and riots would ensue as 
people fought over the food. Some of the parachutes landed on mine 
fields or hit people who were rushing to grab food that had already 
landed. Several people died or were wounded trying to get to the 
food. Under these circumstances, the weak, the elderly and the 
young had a hard time getting food, although they were the ones who 
most needed it. To end the chaos, US Army special forces had to be 
committed to control the mobs rushing to the drop zone.
Eventually, large helicopters from the US and British armies, 
(CH-47s), US Air Force (HH-53s) and US Marines (CH-53Es) were able 
to reach the area and deliver many of the high priority goods as 
well as food.
The airdrop has to be set against the fact that food
4DART SitRep, April 23, 1992.
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deliveries by surface were being made to most of the camps even as 
the airdrops were beginning. Most of the camps were accessible by 
truck or pack animal. A review of relief agency, Red Crescent and 
World Food Programme records during for the period^show that the 
tonnages delivered by land were equal to, and in many cases 
exceeded, the amounts being dropped. Even when the airdrops became 
more routine, the amount delivered by land was significantly 
greater than the amounts parachuted in.
Finally, a word has to be said about the cost of the airdrop. 
The fuel bill for the C-130s was more than the annual budget of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Large scale 
airdrops are expensive.
All these deficiencies, however, must be set against the fact 
that they provided the entree for the entire humanitarian 
assistance operation. Without the airdrops, the land phase, which 
repatriated the refugees back to their villages and helped return 
the economy to normal, would have been much riskier. From that 
point alone, the airdrop operation has to be considered a major 
tactical success.
Lessons:
• In some cases, the tactical advantages of an airdrop will 
outweigh the practical disadvantages.
• Ground teams must be in place before an airdrop commences 
to receive and organize distribution to prevent the chaos 
the will ensue if they are not there.
• Since the military is likely to undertake similar 
humanitarian operations in the future, the Pentagon should 
consider a variety of options for packaging the common 
relief foods for air delivery (i.e., a more appropriate 
MRE or a packaging and delivery system that could be used 
to provide the basic relief commodities such as grain, 
beans, oil, sugar, salt, and tea).
• The relative success of the heliborne deliveries that 
followed the airdrops argues for expanding that capability 
and augmenting the vertical lift capability of US military 
forces with aircraft such as the CH-53E heavy lift 
helicopter and the new V-22 Osprey Tilt Rotor (which has 
the carrying capacity and range of a small cargo plane and 
the vertical takeoff and landing capability of 
helicopters).
CONCLUSION
Airdrops should always be a last choice, used only when there
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are either no other cost effective means of delivering food or when 
there are overwhelming political and tactical reasons for using the 
approach.
30 April 1992 
INTERTECT
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